The above title is the subtitle of
Richard Rothstein’s recent book, The
Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America
(Liveright: 2017). It is a book that both fascinated and infuriated me. That is
because the myth that most Americans have been fed, especially by the Supreme
Court in its school-desegregation rulings, is that most segregation in America is
de facto—that is, the result of
established housing patterns that were the unintentional
product of economic or cultural choices—and
therefore legitimate. Opposed to this is de
jure segregation—that carried out purposely by government policies, and
therefore, illegal. What Richard Rothstein sets out to demonstrate in stunning
detail, is the fact that segregation in American housing was, in fact, “a
nationwide project of the federal government in the twentieth century” (xii). Basically,
de jure from top to bottom. That is
to say, federal, state and local governments all unconstitutionally denied to
African Americans the right and the means to live in integrated neighborhoods,
thus creating the racist system of unequal schools, neighborhoods, suburbs and
central cities that we see in the United States to this day. What is perhaps
most astonishing is that it was not just the former Confederate states that
have been responsible for this, but the most liberal governments of the last
century like the Roosevelt administration.
Consider
one of the chief culprits in this story, the FHA or Federal Housing Administration
created by Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1934 to help solve the housing and banking crisis
of that time. What the FHA did was to insure bank mortgages covering 80% of a
home’s purchase price, thus removing much of the risk of default from shaky
banks. Grand idea. But the FHA required the appraisal of any property it
insured, and its “standards included a whites-only
requirement” (64), allegedly because it judged that properties in
racially-mixed neighborhoods would be too risky to insure. Rothstein cites from
the FHA’s Underwriters Manual:
“If a neighborhood is to retain
stability it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the
same social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy
generally leads to instability and a reduction in values” (65).
The same government manual warned appraisers
against the “infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups” and
against areas where children are “compelled” to attend schools with pupils from
“lower level(s) of society,” code for African Americans. Now it should be said
that Franklin Roosevelt was under severe constraints to get his New Deal
legislation passed, most specifically from southern Democrats who were
determined, the Civil War notwithstanding, to maintain segregation in America;
so he was forced to tailor New Deal legislation so that it would pass this
congressional roadblock. But it is nonetheless stunning to realize that, in
spite of the Fourteenth Amendment and several Supreme Court decisions against
both public and private laws or covenants imposing racial segregation, the U.S.
government created both the FHA and the earlier HOLC (Home Owner’s Loan
Corporation) that, in effect, either maintained or created new segregation in the United States. The HOLC, for
instance, formed in 1933 to take over existing mortgages subject to foreclosure
(as many were in the Depression), and issue new mortgages to save homeowners
and banks from ruin, started the practice of assessing “risk” in neighborhoods
where it intervened. It used real estate agents to assess these risks, and since
these agents had to abide by their ‘national ethics code to maintain
segregation,’ the HOLC ended up considering the racial composition of all
neighborhoods, and thereby created the “color-coded maps of every metropolitan
area in the nation,” with “safe” neighborhoods colored green, and “risky”
neighborhoods colored red. Again, “risky” and “red” are clear codes for “Black,”
leading directly to the practice of “redlining” that has persisted to this day.
Rothstein
provides endless examples of how this government-sponsored segregation worked
in practice. To begin with, it should be noted that in the post-war years, both
the FHA and the VA (Veteran’s Administration) were insuring fully “half of all
new mortgages nationwide,” so their influence was huge. Consider a 1958 case,
in my former Berkeley neighborhood, the Elmwood, where a teacher named Gerald
Cohn purchased a house with an FHA-guaranteed mortgage; but since he wasn’t quite
ready to move in, he rented it to a fellow teacher, Alfred Simmons, who was
black. This so alarmed the chief of police, that he inquired “how Mr. Simmons
had managed to get into this all-white community” (66) and notified the FBI.
Though the FBI and the US Attorney refused to prosecute (perhaps because they
understood the Constitution), the FHA was not so kind; it blacklisted Mr. Cohn,
informing him that “he would be denied the benefits of participation in the FHA
insurance program” ever again. For this was clear FHA policy: no mortgage guarantees to African Americans
or even to whites who tried to rent or sell to African Americans. When we
consider another case, involving the iconic suburban development called
Levittown on Long Island, we can see what this meant. Vince Mereday was a U.S.
Navy veteran of WWII, honorably discharged. Working after the war for his uncle
Robert who had a contract to deliver building materials to Levittown but
couldn’t buy there, Vince decided, as a Black veteran with a solid job, to try his
luck in buying a Levittown home. Veterans who bought in this way could buy a
three-bedroom home for $8,000, with no
money down, thanks to the low-interest VA and FHA-guaranteed loans. But
there were racist restrictions in these government programs: no insured
mortgages for developments that included any African Americans. Indeed, developers
could not even get loans to begin
developments until they assured banks that their new suburbs would be racially
segregated. Unsurprisingly, Vince Mereday was turned down, and had to settle
for an alternative: a home in nearby Lakeview, an all-black suburb near
Levittown. It cost him, like all African Americans deprived of FHA loans; for
he had to make a large down payment, get an uninsured mortgage from a bank, and
that meant a far higher interest rate and monthly payment. This became a
pattern nationwide, not least in the suburban subdivisions that, after the war,
completely changed the American landscape. Entire suburbs throughout the nation,
thanks to FHA requirements, became racially-exclusive white enclaves. Indeed,
Rothstein shows how “the growth of California and the West in the decades
following World War II was financed on a racially-restricted basis by the
federal government” (73). Developments in Milpitas CA, Westlake south of San
Francisco, Lakewood south of Los Angeles and Panorama City in the San Fernando
Valley were all FHA-guaranteed whites-only
projects. And where, as outside of St. Louis, a developer did create a subdivision for African
Americans, he could not get FHA financing. The result was that
the construction was shoddier and the
house design skimpier than in St. Ann (the developer’s previous all-white
project guaranteed by FHA). Because potential buyers were denied FHA or VA
mortgages, many homes were rented (73-4).
And, as Rothstein explains
elsewhere, having to scramble to make rent or mortgage payments, many African
Americans resorted to renting out rooms or crowding more family members into
homes, thus creating conditions that led to deterioration—for which they were and
still are, routinely blamed. In summary, the federal government’s programs
designed to help Americans become homeowners, specifically applied only to whites, and this, in turn, “spurred the
suburbanization of every metropolitan area by guaranteeing bank loans to
mass-production builders who would create all-white subdivisions that came to
ring American cities” (75), leaving inner city neighborhoods to deteriorate. In
response, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights came to this conclusion:
the
“housing industry, aided and abetted by Government, must bear the primary
responsibility for the legacy of segregated housing…Government and private
industry came together to create a system of racial segregation” (75).
Unfortunately,
and infuriatingly, this was only the beginning of a continuing, and
still-existing system of racial segregation in the United States of America.
Rothstein’s book is full of more details—zoning laws that forced industries,
often polluting industries, to settle in African American neighborhoods, literally
creating unhealthy slums; routing interstate highways to create racial
boundaries or condemn African American neighborhoods altogether; turning a
blind eye to racist mobs rioting in response to attempts by African Americans
to buy into segregated neighborhoods (in one instance in a Louisville KY
suburb, there were cross burnings and bombings but no indictments of the
rioters until a grand jury indicted the
sellers, Carl and Ann Braden, for “conspiring to stir up racial conflict by
selling the house to African Americans” and sentenced Mr. Braden to fifteen
years in prison for his “crime,” until he won release on appeal), and using the
tax code to add to the already-overwhelming burden African Americans had to
face in trying to own a home. It is a story that casts in an entirely new light
upon the constant criticisms of deteriorating and high-crime neighborhoods (recall
the racist remarks candidate Donald Trump made about inner-city slums), because what
it demonstrates is that these “deplorable conditions” were essentially created
by government fiat and business policies (such as private covenants that
excluded sales to African Americans). When one adds the concerted legal
maneuvering to deprive African Americans of anything approaching the job
opportunities available to whites (the minimum wage laws were deliberately created
[again, at the behest of southern Democrats] to exclude jobs in agriculture and
domestic service-- jobs typically held by African Americans), one begins to
wonder how any person of color ever manages to survive at all.
Let
me cite one more case from Rothstein’s book, this one involving the Techwood
Homes in Atlanta, opened in 1935. This was a project of the Public Works
Administration (PWA), which, despite its good intentions, “segregated projects
even where there was no previous pattern of segregation” (21). Amazingly, the
head of the new PWA was Harold Ickes, a former president of the Chicago branch
of the NAACP. Nonetheless, though he ensured that the PWA did build publicly-financed homes for African Americans, he
maintained segregation as the PWA's dominant mode (of 47 projects, 17 were for
African Americans, while 21 were for whites only). In Atlanta, this meant that
the Techwood Homes, built on “land that was cleared by demolishing the Flats, a
low-income integrated neighborhood
adjacent to downtown that had included 1600 families, nearly one-third of whom
were African American” (22), became a project with 604 units for white families only. This was bad
enough. But what the PWA project did was to force low-income African American
families out of the formerly-integrated Flats into the only places they were
allowed: overcrowded “neighborhoods where African American were already living.”
This meant doubling up with relatives or renting rooms made available by other
African Americans subdividing their houses. Rothstein summarizes the effect of
this program ostensibly meant to alleviate inadequate housing for lower and
middle-income families:
A
result of the government program, therefore, was the increased population
density that turned the African American neighborhoods into slums (22).
Think about it: the federal
government’s program not only turned what had been an integrated neighborhood
into a whites-only project, but, as a direct result of its efforts, made
existing African American neighborhoods worse, turning them into slums.
Such is the legacy
of racism and segregation in the United States of America. It is a tale that,
despite making one ashamed of being American, should be studied by everyone,
not least the allegedly well-informed members of our Supreme Court, our
Congress, our White House, and certainly, the children in all of our schools.
Lawrence DiStasi