I can do no better in conveying the
gist of Kurt Andersen’s
book, Fantasyland: How America Went
Haywire (Random House 2017), than by quoting a long passage from its first
chapter:
America was created by true believers
and passionate dreamers, by hucksters and their suckers—which over the course of four centuries
has made us susceptible to fantasy, as epitomized by everything from Salem
hunting witches to Joseph Smith creating Mormonism, from PT Barnum to Henry
David Thoreau to speaking in tongues, from Hollywood to Scientology to
conspiracy theories, from Walt Disney to Billy Graham to Ronald Reagan to Oprah
Winfrey to Donald Trump. In other words: mix epic individualism with extreme
religion; mix show business with everything else; let all that steep and simmer
for a few centuries; run it through the anything-goes 1960s and the Internet
age; the result is the America we inhabit today, where reality and fantasy are
weirdly and dangerously blurred and commingled (11).
That gets to a major portion
of what Andersen has assembled to focus our attention on: the idea that Donald
Trump and his believers are not aberrations so much as the fulfillment of our
long national aspiration to do our own thing, no matter how nutty. Where we
Americans like to think of ourselves as sensible inheritors of Enlightenment
rationalism and realism and pragmatism, there is a very powerful strain in the
national mythos and character that just as powerfully rejects reason and opts
instead for belief—belief in whatever we feel to
be true, regardless of facts or logic or consensus reality. This is why, for
instance, the man who is now President of the United States can justify
anything he says, no matter how fantastical (that he lost the popular vote
because millions of ‘illegals’ voted for Clinton; or that
his offices in Trump Tower were bugged by the Obama administration), by asserting,
and having his aides assert as ‘proof’ that he “does believe that,” and “has believed that for a while.” And when asked by a national
news anchor about such fantasies—“Do
you think that talking about millions of illegal votes is dangerous to this
country without presenting the evidence?”—he
replies “No, not at all! Not at all—because many people feel the
same way I do” (426-7). In Trumpworld, that
is, belief trumps fact every time. What Kurt Andersen does is assemble the
history that leads logically to this sorry situation.
He begins, of course, with the nation’s founders, including the
prospectors who were sure they would find gold in Virginia, the so-called “Pilgrims” for whom even the relaxed Protestantism
of Holland was too constricting, and the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, all of whom comprised highly radical wings of the not-very-old
Protestant movement. These were people who could not stand any interference
with their personal interpretation of the Bible. They felt that God himself had
given them not just a new land where they could build their ‘theocracy,’ but essentially divine
rights to the land over and above those who had lived there for millennia, the
Natives. And they were quite clear that God had also given them the right to
eliminate any who tried to block their settlement, as well as members of other
less-pure sects like Quakers or Catholics. As Andersen notes, from 1675 through
1676, they did so with cold-blooded zeal, embarking on what he calls “the year of pitiless killing” (39) in their war against
the ‘Satanic’ Indians. Believing devoutly
that “Satan visibly and palpably
reigns in America more than in any other known place of the world,” they were able to justify
their slaughter as a religious war against “Satan’s
soldiers” (38). And of course, in
Salem, the outbreak of witchcraft was met with the well-known trials in which
at least twenty witches and sorcerers were executed for alleged fealty to that
same Satan. Yet the colonies survived and thrived, creating a place where the
real opportunity, according to Andersen, was not so much economic as “the permission it gave to
dream up new supernatural or otherwise untrue understandings of reality and
believe them with passionate certainty”
(42).
That auspicious beginning continued literally to the
present-day with new sects sprouting like weeds, each nuttier than the last. So
America got at least two Great Spiritual Awakenings where participants shook
and rattled and spoke in tongues and dedicated themselves to a personal
relationship with the Lord as they understood him; and new sects entirely like
Baptists and Methodists; and then Pentecostals and Seventh-Day Adventists and
fundamentalists and evangelicals and charismatics; and perhaps the craziest of all, Joseph Smith, who somehow convinced his Mormons that America really was the new Holy Land, literally visited by Jesus Christ as proved
by the fact that Smith had met and talked with Him near Cleveland, OH. And millions
believed him. Such willingness to
believe whatever suits the believer made possible the Christian Science of a
woman named Patterson who changed her name to Mary Baker Eddy and insisted in
her book that neither pain nor disease were real: “there’s only belief in pain” and “what is termed disease does
not exist” (79). It also enabled the
founding of over one hundred utopian communities across America including one
that Nathaniel Hawthorne toyed with, Brook Farm. As the discovery of gold in
California in 1849 seemed to prove once and for all, America was the place
where miracles actually happened.
Andersen then shows how all these initial predilections
were given a “quantum” boost by several inventions:
the movies, then TV, and then the Internet. Andersen calls them “a powerful and unprecedented
solvent of the mental barriers between real and unreal” (138). That is, moving
images enwrap the viewer in such a powerful feeling of participation that people
who watch TV (many almost constantly) begin to think that’s what reality is. Or can no longer tell the difference
between what they’ve
seen on screen and what has actually happened (Donald Trump seems to be one of
these people). Add to this the burgeoning of another American fantasy—the nostalgia of living in
suburbs that appear to be embodiments of a pastoral past we all dream of, or
see on screen—and you have a nation of
people bred on make-believe and brainwashed by commercials that feed even more
into that make-believe. In this regard, Andersen makes the notable point that
the word suburbia seems to be a
conflation of suburb and utopia, the apotheosis of which is the
Disney-built town of Celebration, in Florida near Disneyworld. It is total fantasy
of a town, fake to the point that each evening in the Fall, every hour on the
hour, “tissue-paper leaves fall in
the town center,”
while in December, “snowlike
soap flakes drift from the sky”
(405). No need for actual trees or clouds or cold weather here.
There is more about Americans’ astonishing credulity in
this key text, but you get the idea. From belief in UFO abductions to the fake
hysteria over satanic abuse in the 1980s and 90s; from the craziness over the “right” to possess mass-murdering
guns to the Republican Party’s
paranoia over the UN’s
Agenda 21 (a 1990 resolution about sustainable development that the GOP sees as
a plan to coerce us all into a one-world order characterized by “socialist/communist
redistribution of wealth”);
from the Prosperity Gospel of Oral Robers and Ken Copeland and Joel Osteen,
which says that praying to God can make you rich because Jesus himself was a
millionaire and wants you to be rich;
to the Hollywood TV Star Fantasy Camp where you can literally pretend to be a
star with sets and star trailer etc. for only $10,000—what Andersen calls the
fantasy-industrial complex keeps going into higher gear and seems set to get
even more fantastic as the technology of virtual reality becomes ever more
convincing. The net result, of course, is the increasing inability (or
unwillingness) of Americans to distinguish between fact and fiction, fake and
real. And what’s
worse is that since the United States has become the world’s greatest exporter of
fantasy and fantasy religion, our disease is spreading to the Third World where
more than half a billion Christians, according to Andersen, now subscribe to
Pentecostal or charismatic Christianity, speaking in tongues and “hearing personally from God” (289). Not to mention the
numbers addicted to our films and video gaming.
And,
of course, it has all come back to haunt us with the election of that most
preposterous of salesmen for fantasyland, Donald Trump. Andersen calls him “a pure Fantasyland being, its
apotheosis” (417). And it is true. He is
the great white hope of fantasyland, the one who can, so he promised, bring
Americans back to their imagined era of greatness (and whiteness). And while
those of us in the “reality
community” have a hard time
understanding his appeal, Andersen’s
history helps make sense of it. Indeed, it makes sense of what sometimes seems
a contradiction—the
combination, in Trump’s
followers, of belief in the preposterous on the one hand, and cynical dismissal
of things like science and facts on the other. Andersen quotes from Hannah
Arendt’s masterwork, On Totalitarianism, here, and it is
worth repeating part of that quote:
A mixture of gullibility and cynicism
have been an outstanding characteristic of mob mentality before it became an
everyday phenomenon of masses. In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the
masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe
everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing was
true (436).
I think that very nearly
describes Trump’s
true believers, those supporters who seem deaf to his faults, his lies, his
idiotic statements and retractions in almost the same breath (such as the one he recently
made about having “misspoke” in his disastrous news
conference in Helsinki). Completely unsettled and disoriented by the ‘incomprehensible world’ in which they find
themselves, in which their jobs have vanished and their certainties have been
upended, they take refuge, many of them, in preposterous beliefs about the
bible, and in the obvious lies of a huckster who promises them relief,
improbable though it may be, as well as in cynicism about ‘elites’ and science and global
warming. They can thus think simultaneously that nothing the ‘elites’ say is true (it’s all fake news), and that
everything Trump promises is both true and possible. And what Kurt Andersen
shows us in Fantasyland is that they,
this tribe of dreamers and believers, have been prepared for just this
apotheosis by centuries of American training in and celebration of what can
only be called a childlike way of being. Everything is possible. Nothing is
true except what you believe. You can make anything come true simply by
believing it. Intuitions are equal to facts. And, as Trump’s Witch of Endor said early
on, there may be facts that contradict us, but there are also alternative facts that support us. The question is,
are there enough Americans who care about the difference to save the ship
before it sinks?
Lawrence DiStasi